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Abstract. Legal anti-positivism is widely believed to be a general theory of law that generates 
far too many false negatives. If anti-positivism is true, certain rules bearing all the hallmarks of 
legality are not in fact legal. This impression, fostered by both positivists and anti-positivists, 
stems from an overly narrow conception of the kinds of moral facts that ground legal facts: 
roughly, facts about what is morally optimific—morally best or morally justified or morally 
obligatory given our social practices. A less restrictive view of the kinds of moral properties that 
ground legality results in a form of anti-positivism that can accommodate any legal rule 
consistent with positivism, including the alleged counterexamples. I articulate an ‘inclusive’ 
form of anti-positivism that is not just invulnerable to extensional challenge from the positivist. 
It is the only account that withstands extensional objections, while incorporating, on purely 
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I. The Extensional Challenge 
 Legal positivists and anti-positivists disagree about the grounds of law. They disagree 
about what at the most fundamental level it is in virtue of that a rule gets to be a legal rule.  
Positivism is the view that the ultimate grounds of legality are social in nature. They 
concern the social properties of rules: roughly, having to do with a community’s attitude of 
acceptance towards a rule, or its acceptance by key officials. There are variations on this general 
theme, but positivists stand united in their commitment to instances of fundamental legality—the 
legality of the fundamental legal rules—being grounded exclusively in the social features of 
those rules. The fundamental legal rules are ones which are not themselves ‘derived’ (in a sense 
that stands in need of precisification) from other legal rules. E.g., in Hart’s (1994) formulation, 
legal systems are systems of hierarchically structured rules, with higher-order rules of 
recognition—general rules that legal officials accept and follow in determining what the law is 
governing particular situations—from which the legality of the first-order rules derives (cf. 
Kelsen’s (1945) basic norm). 2 
The disagreement within the positivist camp concerns the grounding of non-fundamental 
legal rules—those derived from the more fundamental ones. ‘Inclusive’ positivists allow that the 
moral features of a derived rule may be part of the explanation for why it is law, but only if a 
higher-order legal rule, whose legality is grounded in its social features alone, entails the legality 
of the derived rule on the basis of the latter’s moral features (Waluchow 1994, Coleman 2001). 
Imagine a jurisdiction whose legal officials have collectively adopted a general convention of 
enforcing whatever fine-grained rules for practical situations that are morally optimal. The 
                                                          
2 Cf. Austin (1832), Raz (1979), Marmor (2011), and Shapiro (2011).  
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conventionally embraced general rule of enforcement is legal solely on account of its social 
features—namely, its conventionality. But the more fine-grained situational rules (e.g. a rule 
dictating when promises are to be enforced against a promissor) may earn their legality partly 
based on their moral features. The ‘exclusive’ positivist agrees that the higher-order rules may 
direct legal officials to rely on moral considerations in deciding what the law is, but denies that 
this means the moral features of rules ground instances of law, whether the legal rules in 
question are instances of derived or fundamental legality. These internecine disagreements 
amongst positivists can be largely ignored in what follows, but I’ll discuss them as they become 
relevant to the argument. 
Anti-positivism is the view that a rule’s moral features ground its legality fundamentally. 
The social features of rules matter, but so does the morality of rules. For example, according to 
traditional varieties of anti-positivism, unless a rule is one we morally ought to obey, or is 
consistent with moral principles that maximally justify our social practices, the rule cannot be 
legal. And this fact isn’t itself explained by any higher-order legal rule whose legality is 
grounded in social conventions or anything of the sort. Law depends fundamentally on 
morality’s sanction.  
 Positivists claim that there are straightforward counterexamples to anti-positivism 
involving rules that bear all the hallmarks of legality but that are by no stretch of the imagination 
ones we morally ought to obey or compatible with basic principles of justice. Among other 
things, the Third Reich promulgated legal rules requiring the outright exclusion and ultimate 
extermination of Jews and other minorities in Nazi Germany. Nazi law was genuine law. In 
antebellum America, the Fugitive Slave Act required the return of a runway slave to their master. 
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The Fugitive Slave Act, morally grotesque though it was, was bona fide law.3 It is easy to 
multiply examples of morally grotesque rules that clearly are laws of states (e.g., California had a 
‘three-strike’ rule, mandating life imprisonment based on three criminal convictions regardless of 
gravity). But if anti-positivism is true, these morally abhorrent rules cannot be law. They might 
be conventionally followed. But their severe moral defects preclude their legality.  
 Nazi law, the Fugitive Slave Act, the three-strike rule in California are actual cases of law 
mobilized as counter-examples to anti-positivism. But there are also possible cases of law that 
present an extensional challenge. Consider a scenario offered by Marmor (2011, Ch4). Marmor 
imagines a community all of whose members sincerely believe that (and act as if) a rule is law: 
they follow it, they sanction deviations from it, they call the rule “law,” they think it is a good 
thing the rule is law, and so on. We can stipulate that all the external trappings of a legal system 
are present (there are courts, police, and a legislative body, for example). If the anti-positivist is 
right, it is possible for everyone in the community to be mistaken about their favored rule’s 
legality. After all, the rule might be immoral: say, one that demands a human sacrifice every 
New Year’s Eve. But, surely, the community cannot be systematically mistaken about the rule’s 
legality. Yet another false negative.  
 Anti-positivism’s perceived extensional inadequacy explains why positivism is the 
dominant position in legal philosophy, or at least why it is so often portrayed as such. To deny 
that the Nazis had law, that the Fugitive Slave Act was law, that Marmor’s hypothetical society 
couldn’t possibly be in error, is counterintuitive.  
                                                          
3 See discussion of the Fugitive Slave Act in Dworkin (1975, 1982) and Shapiro (2011, Ch1). 
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 Anti-positivists have offered two types of responses to this extensional challenge. The 
first charges the critique as question begging. To assume anti-positivism’s negative results are 
false negatives assumes the falsity of anti-positivism. Anti-positivism just is the view that an 
“unjust law is not law.”4 So, contrary to what positivists tell us, the Nazis didn’t have laws, the 
Fugitive Slave Act was not law, and communities can be systematically mistaken about their 
own laws.  
 To repeat, this is a hard position to maintain. While it would indeed be question-begging 
to assume anti-positivism is refuted by simply pointing to these cases of apparent legality, the 
problem for the anti-positivist is that it is very hard to explain away (as widespread error) 
judgments made by a diverse range of experts and non-experts about law.5 The legality of Nazi 
rules is intuitive. And the intuition is pre-theoretical. Individuals unexposed to the debate 
between positivists and anti-positivists find it natural to say that Nazi Germany had a legal 
system (with abhorrent legal rules). If anti-positivists can do no better than deny the legality of 
morally abhorrent rules without plausibly explaining why widely shared intuitions are mistaken, 
anti-positivism is deservedly characterized as the more counterintuitive position. 
The second response, offered by most modern anti-positivists, draws on the fact that the 
morality of legal rules (or entire legal systems) can be influenced by our social practices. A 
rule’s legality is grounded not in its being morally obligatory. Rather, it is grounded in its 
                                                          
4 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae.  
5 Finnis (1980) is sometimes interpreted as suggesting that Nazi law is only law in an analogical sense. We say 
Nazis had law because their rules bear resemblance to the focal genuine cases of law which are morally good rules. 
But this is just to deny the intuition underlying the extensional challenge: that the Nazis had law, not something that 
merely resembles law. 
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compatibility with justice taking into account our social practices. For instance, Dworkin (1986, 
225) suggests that rules have the property of being law only if they “figure in or follow from the 
principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best constructive 
interpretation of the community’s legal practice.” Famously, Dworkin thinks that in figuring out 
what the law is, judges face the Herculean task of, first, figuring out which general principles 
would morally justify, as far as possible, what we do around here—i.e., our social practices.  His 
view allows that there might be aspects of our social practices that morality could never justify, 
that might be irredeemable from the moral point of view. But the content of the law are those 
rules and principles derived from social practice that are compatible with the optimific moral 
principles, the ones which maximally justify how we do things around here.6  Likewise, 
Greenberg (2015, 1301) holds that law is the change in our “moral obligations” driven by our 
social conventions.7 
                                                          
6 An anonymous reviewer suggests a better interpretation of Dworkin regards the social practices as ‘raw material’ 
that is morally interpreted. Dworkin’s view is indeed sometimes understood by analogy with morally interpreting a 
work of fiction, where the ‘morally best’ version of Huckleberry Finn is one which portrays the events of the novel, 
the characters, and so on in their morally best light. But I doubt this is the best of way understanding Dworkin. 
Dworkin is interested in actual moral facts governing what individuals should do and how these facts might be 
shaped by social practice. In any event, this alternative interpretation does not immunize the Dworkinian from the 
counterexamples, as I explain below. 
7 Greenberg (2015) identifies law with our actual moral obligations that have been shaped by social practice. He 
self-conceives as articulating Dworkin’s considered/developed view and cites to personal correspondence as 
evidence that Dworkin agrees (fn28). 
. 
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 These modern refinements to anti-positivism allow law and morality to come apart. The 
rules we morally ought to obey simpliciter may be quite different from the ones we morally 
ought to obey in light of our social practices. The latter might be, all things considered, morally 
inferior, and we might have moral reason to follow them anyway because they represent the rules 
we’ve democratically elected to follow. Rawls’ (1993) arguments for compromising on what is 
morally best in the interest of living on reasonable terms with parties who do not all share the 
same comprehensive moral theory provides a helpful (yet neglected) comparison to Dworkin’s 
view and views inspired by Dworkin.  
 Although modern versions of anti-positivism allow legal rules and morally optimific 
rules to come apart, they cannot accommodate dramatic departures of law from what is morally 
required.8 Dworkinian anti-positivism might accommodate the occasional immoral rule as 
genuine law in a community, like the three-strike laws of California. But it cannot accommodate 
Nazi law. It is entirely implausible that the morally best reconstruction of the conventions and 
practices of the Third Reich would recognize as law rules calling for the murder of Jews in Nazi 
Germany.9 Our conventions—what we do around here—plausibly make some difference to what 
                                                          
8 Alexy (2015): “Not every injustice, but to be sure extreme injustice is not law.” 
9 The Dworkinian denies the legality of Nazi rules. Even if we construe Hercules as engaged in a kind of moralistic 
interpretation of the social practices of Nazi Germany, it is entirely implausible that there is a morally best or 
redemptive story of Nazi Germany, a society where the socially embraced rules call for genocide. And even if there 
were one, it wouldn’t sanction the legality of the genocidal rules. Dworkin’s Herculean judge is certainly willing to 
dismiss large numbers of judges in the United States as straightforwardly wrong about the law, e.g. judges who 
upheld the fugitive slave act, because they failed to recognize the legality of the principles which would morally 
justify (as much as possible) what we do around here and consistency with which is a condition on the legality of 
any rule (Dworkin 1975, 1982). So, the counterexamples apply with full force. 
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rules we should follow in light of the principles of justice and fairness.10 But they cannot make 
the kind of difference which would allow anti-positivists like Dworkin and Greenberg to 
recognize the laws of Nazi Germany as bona fide laws. Likewise, by no stretch of the 
imagination were the rules dubbed legal by judges who upheld the Fugitive Slave Act ones we 
had a moral obligation to obey in light of social practice. 
 Marmor’s challenge also still stands. It remains possible for an entire community to treat 
a set of rules as law that are not the morally best rules for the community to follow given its 
habits, conventions, and practices. And if it is impossible for an entire community to be mistaken 
about its accepted laws, then modern versions of anti-positivism are just as vulnerable to 
Marmor’s extensional challenge. 
 
II. The Normativity of Abhorrent Legality 
 Morally grotesque legal rules may be counterexamples to parochial forms of anti-
positivism. But they are not necessarily counterexamples to anti-positivism. Anti-positivism in 
the most general sense is just the view that the fundamental grounds of law include moral facts: a 
rule’s being law is partly grounded in its moral properties. In addition to what I have called 
optimific moral properties—being morally best, being what ought to be done, being required by 
the principles of justice, and so on—there are moral properties that come in degrees, like the 
property of being morally good to some degree, or the property of being supported by a moral 
                                                          
10 On the moral significance of conventions generally, see Mavrodes (1975). 
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reason. Correspondingly, there are moral facts involving such weak or gradable properties: like 
the fact of a rule’s being such that there is some moral reason to follow it.  
 Traditionally, anti-positivists have attempted to ground law in the optimific moral 
properties of rules. A rule’s being law is grounded in its being the morally best rule to follow, or 
in its being consistent with moral principles that maximally justify community conventions. But 
gradable moral properties can serve as possible grounds of law. Arguments for anti-positivism 
properly understood support this possibility, as I explain shortly. So long as a rule’s legality can 
be grounded in the existence of some moral reason to follow it, the anti-positivist can 
accommodate the legality of any rule recognized as clearly legal by the positivist. For if a rule is 
law and its legality is consistent with positivism, then the rule is conventionally followed or 
accepted in the community by key officials.11 And (I argue) if a rule is widely accepted, then 
quite plausibly there is always some moral reason for agents to follow it, albeit a very weak 
reason.  
 Consider the rules of the Third Reich. The fact that morally grotesque rules involving 
state-sanctioned terror were widely accepted and enforced against persons entails some 
extremely weak and easily missed moral reasons for persons to obey them. There are, e.g., 
reasons of self-protection. Deviating from conventionally embraced rules renders individuals 
vulnerable to sanction. The reasons of self-interest that individuals have for obedience are, I 
submit, moral reasons. While self-interest can be amoral or even immoral when an agent is 
                                                          
11 As I explain below, even rules derived from higher-order rules of recognition enjoy a kind of acceptance by legal 
officials, given a plausible view of what it is for legal officials to follow or be committed to a higher-order legal rule. 
However, the ‘easy’ counterexamples I’ve discussed in this paper and am primarily interested in disarming involve 
rules that are widely embraced, and not just by a handful of legal officials 
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disproportionately sensitive to her own interests to the exclusion of others, concern for one’s self 
can also be perfectly ethical, insofar as every person’s interests matter from the impartial point of 
view.   
 While positivists sometimes acknowledge the existence of normative reasons to follow 
conventionally embraced rules (Raz 1986, Marmor 2009, Shapiro 2011), they neglect the moral 
character of such reasons and the conceptual possibilities they open up for anti-positivists. 
Admittedly, the moral character of reasons to protect and promote one’s interests is not obvious. 
Neither is it uncontroversial.12 Yet the arguments in favor of the proposition seem to me to be 
overwhelmingly plausible, even if it remains true that not all prudential reasons are moral 
reasons, and that not all cases of self-regarding action involve responsiveness to moral reasons.  
 One argument for the moral nature of the relevant class of reasons appeals to the 
character of an agent’s motives for self-protection. The connection between motivational 
experience and evaluative facts is widely recognized. E.g., the ethical intuitionist takes 
motivational and affective experience to involve direct perception of bona fide evaluative facts 
(Cf. Johnston 2001). While not just any motivation could possibly constitute awareness of moral 
facts, it is awfully tempting to think that the evaluative facts made manifest by agent-neutral 
                                                          
12 Reasons of self-interest are often contrasted with other-regarding moral reasons. The former lack the obligatory or 
‘deontic’ force of more familiar varieties of moral reasons (Raz 1999, Little and McNamara 2017). But this contrast 
does not show that the reasons of self-interest are a non-moral species of reasons. See Munoz (unpublished 
manuscript), arguing that the contrast in felt ‘oomph’ can be explained in terms of an absence of countervailing 
reasons in the case of deontic moral reasons, along with the concept of a moral prerogative. In any event, the central 
issue is not whether the reasons are moral (though they are), but whether they are genuinely normative (which they 
are as well). For meta-normative background, see fn13 and fn22. 
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empathic motivation—involving desires that are both ‘impartial’ and ‘welfarist’—are moral in 
nature. A desire is impartial if it does not turn on (isn’t sensitive to) the identities of agents (Cf. 
Hare 1952, Atiq forthcoming). If a desire is welfarist, then it favors states of affairs which 
contribute to individual wellbeing. If this is right, then there can be moral reasons to promote 
one’s own interests because it is possible to be impartially concerned about one’s own pains and 
pleasures. This form of concern involves seeing the pains as worth diminishing not because they 
are yours. It involves seeing the pains as repellent and the pleasures as attractive in an ‘identity-
independent’ way.13 An identity-independent or impartial desire to diminish or avoid pains 
(especially the pains one is intimately acquainted with) involves appreciating (or judging) a 
paradigmatic moral truth, it seems to me: that there is moral reason to avoid the pain, insofar as I 
am able to. This reason invites us to show similar concern for the pains of others and may serve 
as a normative foundation for a broader (and more recognizably moral) concern for general 
welfare.14 
                                                          
13 Aren’t some forms of partial concern moral (e.g., concern for Helen just because she’s Helen)? I doubt it. 
Partiality is at best morally permissible. But I needn’t defend that claim here. The above argument relies on a modest 
assumption: moral reasons are at least those reasons appreciable from an impartial welfarist motivational 
perspective. 
14 Here and elsewhere in the paper I draw on a connection between desire-like attitudes and evaluative judgment. This 
connection has been emphasized by (among others) quasi-realist expressivists (cf. Blackburn 1984; Gibbard 2003), a 
group to which I belong; and ethical intuitionists of the sort who treat all (most?) desire and affect as normative 
‘seemings’ or perceptions of bona fide value (cf. Johnston 2001, and, on one interpretation, Scanlon 1998). As a quasi-
realist, I take normative judgements to be wholly constituted by desire-like attitudes. We use normative language to 
express these attitudes, and our linguistic practice guarantees the existence of real normative properties (as well as 
normative truths, propositions, and so on; cf. Schiffer 2003, Thomasson 2014). It seems plausible that there are 
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The moral reasons of self-protection are reasons to follow even Nazi laws. But it would 
be perverse to overstate the case. While there may be some (non-decisive) moral reason to follow 
a rule that causes extreme harm to others, that reason is vastly outweighed by competing 
considerations that militate against obedience.15 So, a German citizen might have had 
overwhelming moral reason to resist the laws of Nazi Germany, but this would not diminish the 
                                                          
phenomenally (and otherwise) distinguishable varieties of non-cognitive attitudes (cf. Johnston 2001), and that there 
are distinct varieties of normative properties and facts corresponding to these different ways of being motivated, with 
moral facts associated, at a minimum, with empathic motivation. The quasi-realist basis for thinking this is the fact 
that we can introduce normative predicates in our language based on fine-grained distinctions between desire-types 
and their expression (consider the legal ought vs the moral ought); and there are properties corresponding to these 
predicates for the usual ‘easy’ ontological reasons (cf. Schiffer 2003). I realize this is extremely breezy. But the paper 
is not intended as general metaphysics and meta-normative theory. I say all this merely as theoretical background for 
the normative claims and arguments I’m making (arguments one needn’t be a quasi-realist to accept). 
15 I take this to be a case of normative outweighing and not defeat. If the severe moral defects of a rule defeat any 
reason to follow the rule, then there aren’t any reasons to follow morally abhorrent rules. I submit that the force of 
the reasons of self-protection to follow abhorrent rules remains appreciable from a motivational point of view of 
impartial empathy. One’s own pains do not lose their disvalue—and the impulse to stop or prevent the pain does not 
diminish—in the light of the pains of others. The self-protective impulse is overcome, in the virtuous, by a stronger 
impulse to do justice and act impartially in the interests of all. But it isn’t extinguished. This is apparent from the 
fact that it seems appropriate for the virtuous to sympathize with their own suffering, even as they engage in acts of 
self-sacrifice supported by the weight of their reasons. Contrast a case of genuine normative defeat: the moral reason 
to promote someone’s pleasure is extinguished by their acting wrongfully, given plausible desert-based normative 
principles. The wrongdoer’s pleasure no longer presents as appealing in the light of serious wrongdoing. 
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moral fact that she had some (albeit very weak) moral reasons, having to do with the good of 
self-protection (impartially construed), for following Nazi rules.16 
 Accordingly, Nazi law is not an example that is per se inconsistent with anti-positivism. 
If there is a viable version of anti-positivism on which instances of abhorrent legality are partly 
grounded in weak moral reasons for obedience, it would avoid the counterexample. And we’ll 
see in a moment that there is indeed a viable view which takes this form. The point for present 
purposes is simply to identify the relevant moral facts in which the legality of morally abhorrent 
rules might be grounded. (If the emerging strain of anti-positivism appears too watered-down to 
be interesting, such concerns should be set aside for the time being. I explain in §3 why this 
particular grounding claim is entailed by a promising general theory of law that is consistent with 
the principle motivations for being an anti-positivist, that captures the unity of the concept of 
law, and that explains how the social and moral characteristics of rules work together to ground 
their legality. The present aim is simply to clarify the scope of the alleged counterexamples). 
Consider Marmor’s hypothetical. Marmor suggests that anti-positivism entails a 
community might be systematically mistaken in its treatment of rules as law. But anti-positivism 
does not entail this. The force of the hypothetical turns on the assumption that moral properties 
                                                          
16  An anonymous referee suggests a society of lunatics with suitably bizarre conventions may prove challenging for 
my view. The relevant rules may be widely accepted, and yet it would not be in anyone’s prudential self-interest to 
follow them. I suspect even bizarre but conventionally embraced rules will generate extremely weak moral reasons 
for some agents to follow them (see discussion below concerning reasons grounded in subjective attachments). But 
it is also worth noting that the legality of such fanciful rules is less obvious than the primary cases discussed. In §4, I 
discuss what makes for an ‘easy’ counter-example to anti-positivism. 
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that ground law according to the anti-positivist must always be optimific. If the legality of rules 
is always grounded in their moral optimality (whether relativized to social practice or not), it is 
possible for law and people’s treatment of a rule as law to come apart. But so long as we have 
gradable moral properties in the picture, we see that a rule that the community treats as law is 
guaranteed to have some moral properties: the property of being good to follow to some degree. 
And so, an anti-positivist willing to ground some instances of legality in weak moral reasons 
may agree with Marmor about the impossibility of error, while disagreeing about its explanation. 
Why does conventional acceptance of a rule’s legality entail some normative reasons, 
moral or otherwise, to follow the rule, even if there is no moral obligation? As before, the 
widespread acceptance of a rule entails a prudential interest in following it, which ensures the 
existence of some moral reasons for obedience. Moreover, ‘acceptance’ of a rule arguably 
involves having a desire or pro-attitude towards following it (cf. Woods 2018). While by no 
means uncontroversial, it is a viable ethical position that there is always some reason to perform 
an action whenever one desires it (cf. Williams 1975, Schroeder 2007).17 The overwhelming 
                                                          
17 There are different ways of getting to the result that whenever you have a desire to ϕ, you have some reason to ϕ. 
One way is to be a kind of hedonist (or desire satisfaction theorist) who embraces a first-order normative view 
concerning what there is reason to do—namely, to satisfy one’s desires. This kind of view does not necessarily 
explain why there are those reasons (cf. Williams 1979). Another route to the conditional claim involves embracing 
an analytic or reductive claim about what it is for there to be a reason to do something. This kind of Humean holds 
that what it is for some consideration to be a reason for you to do something is (roughly) for it to explain why doing 
it would satisfy your desires (cf. Schroeder 2007).  Scanlon’s (2014) discussion of the distinction is helpful. For 
present purposes, I can remain neutral between these two views, though I accept only the first-order substantive 
claim, which I take it to be supported by the many instances in which an agent’s desires to ϕ and reasons to ϕ co-
travel. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to make this explicit. 
Forthcoming in Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy     15 
 
weight of reasons that speak against the satisfaction of certain perverse desires should not be 
confused with the state of there being no reason whatsoever (moral or otherwise) for satisfying 
them. There are other, related reasons for following conventionally accepted rules of a broadly 
‘Humean’ variety, which derive from an agent’s attachment to tradition or conventional ways of 
doing things—a desire to keep doing how we do things around here.18  
It bears emphasizing that the moral (and broadly normative) facts I’m suggesting might 
ground morally grotesque legal rules are limited in scope. The claim isn’t that every agent 
subject to a legal rule has reasons to follow the rule. The identified reasons for following 
abhorrent rules won’t apply to agents who can break laws without consequence or those who fail 
to have any attachment or professional commitment to conventionally embraced rules. Anti-
positivists needn’t ground every legal rule in perfectly general moral or normative facts. The best 
arguments for anti-positivism, we shall see in a moment, are compatible with the legality of 
some rules being partly grounded in minimalistic moral features and particularistic normative 
truths: the existence of some reasons for some agents to follow the relevant rules. 
I have said nothing so far about instances of ‘derived’ legality that aren’t themselves 
conventionally embraced. Positivists maintain that the higher-order rules (of recognition or 
otherwise) need to be conventionally accepted in order to be legal. But perhaps the rules derived 
from the rule of recognition can be forgotten, or widely ignored, or even widely ridiculed, and 
                                                          
18 The appeal of etiquette norms seems to be a function of this mode of concern. These reasons (e.g., to don one’s 
hat in certain social situations) are, as before, appreciable from a motivational perspective which involves concern 
for conventions or respecting how we do things around here. For a systematic treatment of the normativity of formal 
standards, see Woods (2018). 
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yet remain legal.19 Couldn’t a morally defective rule derived from a forgotten statute serve as an 
easy counterexample to anti-positivism, since there are no normative reasons to follow such a 
rule that might be derived from its conventionality (or its moral optimality)? 
There are two observations to make about forgotten, morally suboptimal, derived rules. 
First, there appear to be weak normative reasons for some agents to follow even these rules. The 
normative reasons for following such rules may be entirely parasitic on the normative reasons for 
following the higher-order rules of a legal system, which are accepted in the community by, at 
the very least, its legal officials. We can represent rules as functions which take circumstances to 
actions or outcomes, with higher-order rules specifying outcomes in terms of other rules. On a 
plausible view of what it is to follow a rule or be guided by it, following a rule involves adopting 
a practical stance of being willing to bring about the outcome specified by the rule in the relevant 
circumstance insofar as the outcome’s realization depends on one’s practical attitudes. 20  Let us 
grant that acceptance of a higher-order rule by the judges of a legal community generates, at a 
                                                          
19 I credit an anonymous reviewer for the objection.  
20 There is no forcing the positivist to accept my account of what it is for officials to ‘accept’ the rule of recognition. 
But I think any plausible version of positivism will take the shape I’ve described. A view according to which all it is 
to accept a rule of recognition is to adopt a way of talking (a way of using the term “law”) seems to me to miss an 
enormous amount of what it is to be a judge (or a legal official) who has taken an oath of fidelity to law. It is notable 
that positivists have been less than transparent in their account of the nature of rules and rule-following. E.g. Hart 
(1994, p8, 82-86) declares “the idea of a rule” is one “without which we cannot hope to elucidate even the most 
elementary forms of law,” but takes rules as primitive. He tells us what necessarily follows from their existence, 
what makes a rule a social rule, and so on. But he doesn’t give us an account of their general nature. So, it is 
reasonable for me to make some assumptions here (and I make them in good faith: they reflect my considered view 
on the nature of rules and rule-following). 
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minimum, desire-based ‘Humean’ reasons for judges to follow it. But then there are instrumental 
reasons for these judges to follow the derived rules. Following the derived rules is the outcome 
the higher-order rules of recognition and enforcement call for. Even if the derived rule has as 
little to do with a judge’s actual situation as a rule requiring companies to make their 
prospectuses available to investors, the judge can follow it in the relevant sense, where this might 
involve being willing to enforce the rule, or being willing to obey it in the (counterfactual) 
circumstance of owning a company (cf. Gibbard’s (2003) contingency plans).21  
                                                          
21 This explains why even so-called ‘power-conferring’ rules are ones which can be followed by judges who accept 
them indirectly. Following a power-conferring rule needn’t involve exercising the power it confers. One way to follow 
a power-conferring rule is to help confer the power when the rule calls for it. E.g., a power-conferring rule of the 
common law of contracts says: <if someone makes a promise backed by ‘consideration’ (where there this is roughly 
a matter of the promise being induced in the right sort of way), the promisee has the power to enforce it>. This rule 
confers a power on the promissee to enforce the promise in court. Judges follow this rule. The promissee takes 
advantage of it.  I realize that there is some pressure from Hart (1994) and others (and contra Austin (1832) and Kelsen 
(1960)) to construe power-conferring rules as not being ‘directed at officials.’ The debate seems to me to misconstrue 
the nature of rules. Rules don’t ‘direct’ themselves to individuals. There are just different ways for different individuals 
to follow a rule. Power-conferring rules should be construed as calling for an outcome where an agent is treated in 
certain specified ways by others and perhaps herself. What does it mean to follow such a rule practically? The answer 
depends on how we flesh out the outcome and on who is doing the following. There is no reason to think the outcome 
can’t require officials (among others) to act in certain ways with respect to the agent (e.g., enforce a promise made to 
the empowered agent). 
So, there are normative reasons to follow power-conferring rules: at the very least, some agents (e.g. judges 
and other officials) have some reason to follow the rules, for the reasons I give in the case of ‘derived’ rules. A juridical 
commitment to the rule of recognition which recognizes the power-conferring rules as law entails some degree of 
commitment to the derived rule. But, in standard (easier) cases of legality, there will be independent non-instrumental 
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Admittedly, the derivative (or instrumental) reasons for following a derived rule will be 
especially weak in some cases, when there aren’t independent moral reasons or reasons having to 
do with the rule’s wider acceptance in the community which militate directly in favor of 
following the rule.  The example of a morally suboptimal rule derived from forgotten statutes 
nicely illustrates this. But—and this is the second notable fact about this general class of rules—
the legality of forgotten statutes is not straightforward (later I explain what makes for an ‘easy’ 
counterexample to anti-positivism). Judges often question the legal relevance of forgotten 
statutes, or old cases that no one cites anymore, treating the rules derived from them as 
possessing a kind of degenerate legality. E.g., under the doctrine of ‘desuetude,’ the legality of 
statues and doctrines can lapse due to neglect. One of the most ancient maxims of the common 
law, cessante rationae legis, cessat at ipsa lex, underpins this doctrine: “the reason for a law is 
the soul of the law, and if the reason for a law has changed the law is changed.”22 Accordingly, 
even positivists should feel some pressure to accommodate or explain why the relevant class of 
rules represent cases of marginal legality at best. 
 The claims I’ve made about the moral and broadly normative reasons agents have to 
follow the wide range of morally defective rules we encounter in legal systems are consistent 
with a robustly objectivist metaethics and a non-relativistic normative ethics.23 The anti-positivist 
                                                          
normative reasons to follow the derived power-conferring rules, e.g., that the rule promotes general welfare, or because 
the rule is widely followed in the community. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for pushing me to make my view on 
power-conferring rules explicit. 
22 Lord Coke in Milborn’s Case. 
23 An anonymous reviewer invites an account of the difference between robust and ‘thin’ (or merely ‘formal’) 
normativity, and whether the reasons I’ve identified for following legal rules are robustly normative. This is a subtle 
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needn’t think moral facts, like the fact that there is a moral reason to follow rules widely 
accepted and obeyed in order to promote one’s own interests, are themselves fully grounded in 
social facts. The social facts would then fully explain the legality of rules and their relevant 
moral features. The anti-positivist can instead treat the moral facts as irreducible. That there is a 
moral reason to follow a conventionally embraced rule might be partly grounded in non-moral 
facts, like the rule’s conventionality. But it is also grounded in a pure moral fact: the moral 
principle that if following a rule promotes your interests, then there is some moral reason to 
follow it (Cf. Scanlon 2013, 36-40). It is this latter moral fact that is part of the explanation for 
the legality of rules and is not itself grounded in a social fact. And as far as first-order ethical 
commitments go, thinking that there are reasons to satisfy desires or moral reasons of self-
                                                          
issue. But as far as I understand the thin/robust distinction, I take the reasons I’ve identified to be metaphysically 
robust—as robust, at any rate, as moral reasons. The reasons of self-protection and reasons to follow conventions 
just because one cares about conventionality are determinates of a single determinable (reasons). They are as 
irreducibly real as moral reasons to promote aggregate wellbeing, and our ontology must make room for them (cf. 
Platonic universals). One interesting distinction in the realm of reasons is not the thin/robust distinction (or a 
distinction concerning the nature of normativity), but the fact that some reasons reflect moral concerns and others 
don’t. The moral character of a reason appears to be a function of the motivations necessary to appreciate the force 
of the reason (non-normatively described: e.g., impartial, and welfarist motivation, in the precise sense I gave 
earlier). And moral reasons have a unique grip on some of us, where this is a descriptive psychological claim. That’s 
the only sense in which the non-moral reasons aren’t ‘robust.’ Talk of robust normativity may be an oblique way of 
talking not about the metaphysics of normativity, but about our special sensitivity to moral reasons, and the fact that 
we assess other schemes of value against moral standards. 
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protection does not entail denying the possibility of a wider range of objective goods that come 
apart from the desires and interests of agents.24 
III. Inclusive Anti-positivism  
 There are moral and broadly normative reasons for various agents to follow rules whose 
legality presents an extensional challenge for anti-positivism. The next step in a defense of anti-
positivism is an account of why an anti-positivist might plausibly hold that the identified 
normative facts ground the relevant instances of legality. The aim is not to systematically defend 
the resulting strain of anti-positivism. It is to state the view’s defining commitments with 
sufficient clarity to show that there is no obvious reason why it couldn’t be true, and to make a 
prima facie case for it in terms of the central motivations for being an anti-positivist—enough of 
a case, at any rate, to secure the logical point: that there is a viable strain of anti-positivism which 
avoids the most famous objection to anti-positivism.  
I’ll begin by stating the general position, writing as if it is true to make exposition easier, 
before motivating it and handling objections. A helpful concept with which to start is that of an 
evaluative perspective marked by special solicitude for conventional ways of doing things but 
                                                          
24 Ethical objectivists sometimes deny that reasons to do as one desires are grounded in facts about our desires, which 
is compatible with my view. On this point, see Scanlon (1998, ch1). Scanlon suggests that all cases of desires seeming 
to give us reasons are really cases where the reason is grounded in some non-motivational fact (e.g. the prospective 
pleasure to be gained from satisfying the desire). For my purposes, all I need is the plausible conditional claim: 
whenever (or, at least, typically when) one has a desire to ϕ, one has some reason to ϕ. It’s true that my view rules out 
an extreme ethical objectivism on which even this conditional claim is false. But perfect neutrality on all ethical 
matters can hardly be foisted on anti-positivists. 
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also moral concern.25 Such ‘mixed’ evaluative perspectives are very familiar. We occupy such a 
perspective when, for example, we weigh our subjective attachments (say, special concern for a 
loved one, or for one’s life projects) against impartial other-regarding moral considerations in 
determining whether a course of action is justified relative to the totality of our values (Williams 
1981). Enculturation in the legal professions is a way of becoming acquainted with a distinctive 
way of caring, a distinctively ‘juridical’ sense of what is valuable, involving high respect for 
conventionality (a commitment to conventional ways of doing things for convention’s sake) as 
well as moral concern (e.g., a commitment to the general welfare, self-protection, and so on). 
This juridical mode of concern may appear fetishistic from the moral point of view. It 
involves, among other things, caring about tradition and the way we do things around here as 
though it mattered intrinsically. But that doesn’t make the values that the juridical evaluative 
perspective makes visible ‘as if’ or ‘imposter’ values. The values are, at worst, morally bad.26 
And, as I emphasize below, what I’m calling the juridical evaluative point of view isn’t entirely 
fetishistic—it is partly constituted by recognizably moral values, involving, e.g., concern for 
general wellbeing. 
Consider a normative property of rules defined in terms of this evaluative perspective: 
that of a rule’s being normatively well-supported to a high enough degree, where what counts as 
a relevant normative reason favoring the rule is based on the evaluative perspective in question, 
                                                          
25 Williams (1979) famously offers an account of normative reasons in terms of what he calls an agent’s “subjective 
motivational set”—the totality of the agent’s commitments, desires, goals, etc.— allowing motivational changes 
based on sound deliberation. I intend the notion of an evaluative perspective to be very close to Williams’ notion of 
a subjective motivational set. 
26 On the normativity of moral vs non-moral value, see fn13 and fn22. 
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involving concern for the social and moral characteristics of rules.27 Being normatively well-
supported to a high enough degree is a threshold normative property. If a rule meets the 
justificatory threshold, it does so in virtue of the sum of social and moral considerations favoring 
a rule, not a precise blend. In some cases, a rule will meet the relevant threshold despite weak 
moral support. When a rule is strongly conventional, its strong ‘social support’, which consists in 
the normative reasons legal officials and others have to follow the rule just because it is 
conventional (because of their attitude of rule-acceptance and commitment to following 
conventions), can be understood as compensating for its extremely weak moral support.28 Not in 
a moral sense. But in the special normative sense I’m suggesting reflects the distinctive 
evaluative perspective under consideration.29 The robust or optimific moral features of certain 
                                                          
27 I intend ‘normative reason’ and the favoring relation here in roughlsy the same sense as Scanlon (1998) when he 
speaks of ‘considerations counting in favor.’  
28 We should distinguish the social property of being conventionally embraced from the normative reason to follow 
the rule that is (normatively) grounded in this social property (what I’m calling ‘social support’). There are normative 
reasons that aren’t grounded in the social property but that depend in a different sense on the social property: e.g., the 
moral reasons I highlighted earlier (of impartial self-protection, among others). A rule’s conventionality does not 
matter intrinsically relative to these moral reasons. What matters intrinsically is the good of self-protection. As 
discussed in §2, the relevant social facts also entail (where this entailment has a normative flavor) desire-based 
‘Humean’ reasons to follow a rule, relative to which the rule’s conventionality is intrinsically normatively relevant. 
The latter are reasons one would be sensitive to were one particularly concerned with respecting conventions for 
convention’s sake (as legal actors often are, perhaps because of internalized professional obligations). Legality is a 
function of the sum of these various types of supporting considerations for following a rule, which may bear differently 
on different agents.   
29 If one values respecting conventions highly enough, moral considerations never trump institutional support. Just 
because moral considerations are relevant from the legal evaluative point of view, this does not mean they have their 
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rules can similarly compensate for their weak social acceptance (in the terminal case, acceptance 
by a single moral agent). In other words, a morally optimific principle may meet the relevant 
threshold of being sufficiently favored despite its weak social acceptance in the community. 
There is a viable strain of anti-positivism which identifies the property of being law with 
the aforementioned normative property of rules (being normatively well-supported to a high 
enough degree…) and that promises to be counterexample proof.  The property identification 
entails a general grounding thesis: 
THE GENERAL GROUNDING  
CLAIM: 
Given any legal rule, the rule’s legality is grounded in 
whatever normative reasons there are for agents to follow 
the rule (where the range of relevant normative reasons is 
defined in terms of the juridical evaluative perspective). 
From this general grounding thesis, more particular grounding claims follow, including that 
instances of morally abhorrent legality (the Fugitive Slave Act) are partly grounded in what weak 
moral reasons agents have to obey the rules, together with normative reasons derived from a 
juridical commitment to following a convention for convention’s sake. If a rule surpasses the 
threshold level of normative support, this fact will always be grounded in whatever normative 
reasons agents have for following the rule, whether they derive from an attachment to 
conventions, or the self-protective interests of persons, or general welfare. Compare: the fact that 
the square is over 40% blue is grounded in facts concerning the square’s blueness—every inch of 
                                                          
usual peremptory force. No doubt the legal evaluative perspective may be criticizable from the moral point of view. 
It may be morally perverse. But that’s true of most evaluative perspectives that are not exclusively concerned with 
morality. And there may be moral reasons of a rule-consequentialist sort which favor some agents cultivating this 
form of concern, and a corresponding sensitivity to the relevant reasons. 
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blueness grounds the threshold fact. Accordingly, a defense of Inclusive Anti-positivism turns on 
a defense of the general grounding thesis (and the property identification), not particular 
grounding claims, concerning, e.g., the legality of the Fugitive Slave Act. 
A defense of the general grounding thesis needn’t be based on brute intuition, or rational 
insight into the nature of law, or anything so remarkable. Inclusive anti-positivism’s core 
commitments can be motivated by appeal to considerations of theoretical power and adequacy. It 
is notable, firstly, that the view, with its defining commitments clarified, does not show any signs 
of obvious error or internal incoherence. Secondly, it amounts to a position on legality that is 
clearly distinguished from positivism. Positivism and inclusive anti-positivism differ in their 
first-order implications concerning which rules are law; in their second-order explanations 
concerning why the relevant rules are law; and in their take on the essence or nature of the 
property of legality. According to inclusive anti-positivism, the concept of law is the concept of 
an objective normative similarity across rules which possess a variable mix of social and moral 
properties. The relevant similarity consists in the normative well-supportedness of these rules 
relative to the values characteristic of a distinctive (if vaguely defined) juridical evaluative 
perspective.30 Positivists rarely make their views concerning the nature of the legal property 
explicit. But no positivist, as far as I can tell, construes the property of legality as essentially 
identical to a bona fide normative property.  
                                                          
30 I am intentionally vague about several aspects of the juridical evaluative perspective, including the precise 
relationship between social and moral support. We should not aspire for greater determinacy in our account of a 
concept than its nature warrants. As I explain below, the imprecision has an explanatory upshot. 
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The explanatory differences are related to this essentialist difference. The least 
controversial instances of legality are ones involving legal rules that are both conventionally 
embraced and morally optimific. These rules are law, according to the inclusive anti-positivist, 
because they clearly surpass the threshold of normative well-supportedness. By contrast, the 
positivist claims these rules are law just because they are conventionally embraced or because 
they are derived from rules of recognition that are conventionally embraced.  
The views differ extensionally. There exists a possible jurisdiction where a morally 
optimific principle—say, a principle banning the torture of animals in factory farms—enjoys 
very little conventional support. Furthermore, the principle cannot by derived from any 
conventionally embraced rule of recognition in the jurisdiction. The inclusive anti-positivist 
declares the principle (marginally) legal, whereas the positivist, whether inclusive or exclusive, 
denies the principle’s legality.31  
 In addition to being sharply distinguished from both inclusive and exclusive varieties of 
positivism, inclusive anti-positivism seems eminently defensible based on the types of 
considerations which motivate anti-positivism generally. There is considerable irony in the fact 
that the best arguments for anti-positivism turn out to be extensional. Although rarely 
characterized as such, the classic arguments which appeal to judicial behavior emphasize an 
extensional inadequacy of positivism (Dworkin 1967, 1975; Radbruch 1990). Judges routinely 
classify rules that enjoy strong moral support as law even if there isn’t a widespread convention 
                                                          
31 I discuss whether this extensional difference generates an ‘easy’ counterexample in §4.  
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within the jurisdiction of following the rule.32 And they appear to be doing so on conceptual 
grounds alone, because there is no obvious social convention within jurisdictions which 
authorizes such behavior by judges.  For instance, Dworkin (1967, 20-25) provides various 
examples of common law judges invoking general moral principles as law, and without citing to 
custom, including, for example, the principle that “courts will not permit themselves to be used 
as instruments of inequity and injustice.” Dworkin argues that in determining the content and 
application of these principles, judges view themselves as figuring out the law, but the content of 
these principles cannot be grounded in conventionally embraced rules. 
In fact, judges don’t simply make first-order judgments ascribing legality to morally 
optimific rules. They make second-order judgments about why these rules are legal—judgments 
that are prima facie incompatible with positivism. For example, in the famous contracts case of 
Bailey v. West, the court explains that a benefactor who voluntarily confers a benefit without the 
explicit consent of the beneficiary is sometimes owed remuneration where the obligation is 
grounded in a “law of natural immutable justice.” The court does not say that the reason why the 
relevant principle of justice concerning fair compensation is law is that it is socially treated as 
such, or that there is a convention of treating basic principles of justice as law, or that the rule is 
derived from conventionally embraced rules. Judges describe natural justice as a fundamental 
                                                          
32 Additionally, judges justify broader interpretive methodologies by appeal to moral considerations, and not as an 
indirect means of identifying the socially embraced methodology for interpreting law (Dworkin 1986). For positivist 
rejoinders, see Raz (1979, Ch9) and Waluchow (1994). We needn’t assume Dworkin prevails over his critics 
(though I think he does) in order to show that inclusive anti-positivism of the sort developed in this section can be 
motivated based on considerations that have traditionally inspired anti-positivists.  
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source of law.33 Taking the phenomenon at face value, judges treat the legality of morally 
optimific principles as not needing to be further explained in terms of conventions or anything 
social. It is easy to multiply similar examples.34 
If we take judicial intuitions about the legality of rules seriously, positivism seems 
falsified by the existence of morally well-supported rules that are recognized as law simply 
because they are morally well-supported. Positivists have offered various responses to this 
extensional challenge, none of which seem to me to be very plausible. One response, favored by 
inclusive positivists (Waluchow 1994), insists on a social conventional explanation for why 
judges recognize morally optimific principles as law. There is a conventionally embraced rule of 
recognition, we’re told, in the relevant jurisdictions that calls on judges to recognize morally 
optimific principles as law. But as a matter of social fact it is highly controversial whether the 
conventionally embraced rule of recognition in common law jurisdictions licenses the move from 
the moral optimality of a rule to its legality. We must distinguish behavioral regularities from 
conventions. Judicial willingness to classify moral principles as law may be a regularity. But it is 
not self-conscious (social) rule-following; a fact apparent from considerable disagreement 
                                                          
33 E.g., see Hammond v. Allen, 2 Sumn. 387; 11 F. Cas. 382, (1836). See also Blackstone's (1765) Commentaries, 
pp.69-70. 
34 A systematic catalog of all relevant cases illustrating this phenomenon is reserved for future work. A quick search 
of all state and federal US cases and pre-1777 English reports for uses of “laws of natural justice” (and various 
equivalents) returns 1,115 hits. A search for “moral law” or “natural law” returns 4,184 hits. And a search for 
“principles of justice” returns over 10,000 hits. The evidence is not limited to common law or modern jurisdictions. 
There are examples across history; for example, from pre-Christian Rome. Pomeroy (1907, §8) in his treatise on 
equity describes pre-Christian Roman magistrates who treated the stoic theory of morality as an original source of 
law, discovered and not invented. Pomeroy, it is worth emphasizing, has no anti-positivist axe to grind. 
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amongst judges about whether local custom authorizes appeals to morality in the discovery of 
law. Judges sympathetic to positivism describe such conduct by their peers as “judicial 
usurpation” of the administration of morality.35 Meanwhile, judges friendly to the “laws of 
natural justice” acknowledge the disagreement and deem their peers mistaken, not about the 
conventions in place in the jurisdiction but about law’s conceptual connection to morality. The 
(inclusive) positivist’s account of the practice in terms of a rule of recognition embraced by legal 
officials is rendered, at a minimum, doubtful in light of such disagreement.  
Furthermore, the inclusive positivist’s response to the challenge runs up against the 
second-order explanations these judges give for why morally optimific rules can be law, 
explanations which suggest a fundamental conceptual identification of law with morality, not an 
indirect or derivative legality. So, the positivist owes us an explanation for why interpreters of 
law are mistaken. Positivism entails a significant error theory concerning experts to whom our 
community defers on questions of law. 
Positivists sometimes charge judges as engaged in a kind of pretense or outright 
deception. We’re told judges friendly to the ‘laws of justice’ are engaged in law-making but are 
pretending to discover pre-existing law. But uncharitable explanation seems implausible in the 
case of, say, pre-Christian roman magistrates who deemed the stoic theory of morality as a 
source of roman law, discovered and not invented (Pomeroy 1907, §8). If these judges had any 
political reasons to lie about the grounds of law, those reasons are not obvious.36 In any event, 
                                                          
35 See e.g. Orr v. Quimby, 51 N.H. 590, 646 (1874). 
36 Dworkin (1986) makes a similar point about common law judges. For a positivist response, see Marmor (2011, 
p90). The implausibility of an explanation which appeals to juridical fraud seems especially apparent in the case of 
ancient legal societies.  
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uncharitable interpretation should be a kind of fallback option, if there is no better theory of the 
nature of our legal concept that can vindicate the judgments of legal experts. Fortunately, a 
theory which avoids this kind of undermotivated lack of charity is in the offing. 
Anti-positivists have undermined the force of the juridical considerations by declining to 
follow the extensional logic where it leads. As noted, anti-positivists have tended to dismiss or 
altogether ignore judicial willingness to classify morally abhorrent but strongly conventional 
rules as law. A truly extensionally adequate theory of law, one that takes seriously the 
extensional intuitions of experts, would be consistent not just with their willingness to classify on 
conceptual grounds alone strongly moral but weakly conventional principles as law, but also 
abhorrent laws like the Fugitive Slave Act.  
Inclusive anti-positivism promises to be consistent with both strands of judicial behavior. 
According to the inclusive anti-positivist, judges will recognize as law morally optimific but 
weakly conventional rules as well as strongly conventional but weakly moral rules, because these 
two types of rules represent different ways of meeting the normative threshold of being 
sufficiently worth following from the juridical evaluative perspective, where conventions matter 
greatly but so does the morality of rules. This seems to me to be the main virtue of the strain of 
anti-positivism I’ve described: it achieves a better extensional fit than positivism as well as 
traditional versions of anti-positivism, without devolving into a gerrymandered theory of law.  
Which brings us to a second theoretical virtue: the view captures and explains the unity 
of our concept of law. The inclusive anti-positivist does not purchase extensional adequacy at the 
disjunctivist’s price of saying legality is sometimes wholly grounded in social properties and in 
other cases wholly grounded in optimific moral properties.  This would be implausible because, 
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in general, non-disjunctive phenomena do not have as independent full grounds two entirely 
distinct types of facts. Social/empirical facts about a rule’s conventionality and moral facts about 
a rule’s being morally favored are intuitively quite different propositions (Moore 1903). A non-
disjunctive type of fact can’t be both wholly grounded in B-facts and wholly grounded in C-
facts, when B-facts and C-facts are entirely dissimilar. The disjunctivist might try to defend her 
claims on semantic grounds, arguing that the term “law” is polysemous: we use it to refer to two 
very different kinds of phenomena. But if “law” were like the English word “bank,” we would 
expect to find some natural language that disambiguates the two senses by giving them different 
names (like "berge" and "banque" in French). We don't find this disambiguation in the case of 
"law." On the contrary, we find that the variety of legal rules exhibit an appearance of unity (Hart 
1994, Ch1).37  
Inclusive anti-positivism vindicates this appearance. The concept of law is the concept of 
an objective similarity class. It is the concept of a normative similarity possessed by a set of 
rules, appreciable from an evaluative perspective requiring enculturation in the legal profession. 
Relatedly, it is always a combination of moral and social properties of rules that grounds their 
legality, although the mix might differ in individual cases, just as an object’s redness can be 
grounded in its being one of a range of determinate shades of red, with variable hue, chroma, and 
brightness. Another helpful comparison may be found in what Kovacs (2018) calls “aggregative 
cluster concepts” like <is bigger than> which combines volume, length, and mass, but without a 
                                                          
37 To be sure, many of our concepts are revealed to be gerrymandered or defective upon investigation. But the 
appearance of unity should be taken seriously as a theoretical starting point. Its vindication constitutes a theoretical 
virtue. 
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precise trade-off function. The analogy with redness and other properties which give rise to an 
objective similarity or natural unity is intended very seriously. A theory of law is attractive to the 
extent that it identifies legality with a property that can serve a useful theoretical role on account 
of its nature and that can explain how the moral and social characteristics of rules work together 
in generating law. Legality, as construed by inclusive anti-positivism, is just such a property. It is 
the bona fide normative property of rules one would be sensitive to were one’s evaluative 
perspective marked by uniquely high solicitude for conventional ways of doing things but also 
recognizably moral values. 
Inclusive anti-positivism incorporates a large part of the content of morality into law. One 
of the principle motivations for being an anti-positivist is the possibility of a moral critique and 
improvement of law from an internal to law perspective. It is always possible to morally criticize 
a system of rules from the external point of view. One might morally object to the rules of 
Monopoly because they encourage acquisitiveness.  It is quite another thing to critique a system 
of rules using its own rules. The inclusive anti-positivist can say that while morally abhorrent 
rules were law in Nazi Germany, so was a rule requiring respect for human dignity, even though 
it was not recognized as such. The rule had enough morally going for it that it arguably met the 
legal normative threshold.38 Had it been recognized as law by Nazi jurists, there might have been 
                                                          
38 I am intentionally vague about several aspects of the relationship between social and moral support: e.g., how the 
supportive reasons are individually weighted (how much social support matters compared to moral support in the 
additive function which determines whether the legal normative threshold is reached); and the precise threshold of 
normative well-supportedness that suffices for legality. I haven’t taken a stand on these issues because, for one, I 
don’t have a refined enough sense of the juridical evaluative perspective. But the more important reason for 
embracing vagueness is that it results in an explanatorily powerful theory of law. The vague, imprecise nature of the 
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greater official resistance against the Third Reich. (That the laws of a regime can conflict is of 
course a commonplace.)  
 The significance of a robust incorporation of morality into law is hard to overstate. 
Consider the perspective of a conscientious judge concerned with abiding by her distinctively 
legal duties. Such a judge will not rule against the law, unless authorized by law to do so. If 
inclusive anti-positivism of the form I’ve described is true, it remains possible for a judge to 
comply with her legal duties while striking down morally abhorrent laws for conflict with other 
laws that are morally optimal even if weakly conventional. An account of law’s nature which 
secures on conceptual grounds alone a moral critique of law that is, at the same time, a legal 
critique is a view worth taking seriously.39   
  It is true that even the positivist can secure an internal-to-practice moral critique of a 
legal system, provided the right sort of conventional rules are in place.40 But the availability of 
such a critique, given positivism, is socially contingent. The existence of the relevant 
conventionally embraced legal rules in modern jurisdictions which license moral critique is 
controversial. And the anti-positivist’s central intuition is that it is an essential feature of legal 
systems that they render moral critique and improvement of law by jurists lawful. To put it 
                                                          
juridical evaluative perspective delivers a nice account of why we encounter disagreement at the normative margins, 
but convergence at the core—that is, agreement about the legality of rules that are both conventional and morally 
optimal. The phenomenon of concepts/properties constituted by imprecise functions is utterly familiar. That’s the 
point of analogizing with <is bigger than> and <red>. Legality is of a piece with other determinables with vague 
natures which nevertheless exhibit a natural unity. 
39 This isn’t just wishful thinking. Arguably, judges behave as though an internal-to-law moral critique is possible, 
and not because a convention authorizes such behavior (Dworkin 1975; Atiq forthcoming). 
40 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for the objection. 
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differently, the lawfulness of such a critique in any jurisdiction seems intuitive before we learn 
anything about what conventions are in place in the jurisdiction.  
The above remarks are not intended as a substitute for a full-fledged argument for 
inclusive anti-positivism. We’ve secured, however, the beginnings of an argument at the very 
least. Inclusive anti-positivism’s extensional power (its compatibility with the judgments of 
experts concerning the laws of a community), its consistency with the apparent unity of the 
concept of law, its compatibility with a moral critique of law that is at the same time a legal 
critique, suggests a plausible form of anti-positivism worthy of serious consideration. I suspect 
that the case for inclusive anti-positivism is even stronger than I have had occasion to explore 
here.41 But my present aim has been a modest one, limited to framing and illuminating a novel 
hypothesis in the theory of legality, in a way that shows that a bit of orthodoxy in legal 
philosophy concerning one of the most powerful objections to anti-positivism is mistaken. Anti-
positivism is not per se vulnerable to easy counterexamples from the positivist. 
 
IV. What About False Positives? 
 There are two kinds of counterexamples one can mobilize against a view. There are false 
negatives: cases of manifest legality that the view cannot capture. But there might also be false 
                                                          
41 The imprecise nature of the juridical evaluative perspective may explain why we encounter disagreement with 
respect to cases of law involving rules which score highly in terms of social support but not moral support and vice 
versa; as well as general agreement about the legality of rules which enjoy both forms of normative support. 
Everyone agrees about the legality of rules that are both strongly conventional and morally optimal, because these 
rules easily surpass the threshold of normative support required for legality. Case of marginal legality are more 
likely to inspire disagreement. 
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positives: rules that the view entails are law but that don’t appear to be. Even if I’m right that 
inclusive anti-positivism is invulnerable to extensional challenges based on false negatives, 
perhaps grounds for an extensional challenge remain. Isn’t it obvious that a rule requiring respect 
for human dignity failed to be law in Nazi Germany?  
 The focus on false negatives is well-motivated.  An extensional challenge based on the 
denial of the legality of weakly conventional yet morally optimific moral principles would be far 
less compelling than a challenge based on the legality of Nazi rules. Everyone agrees that the 
legality of rules is often obscure. Interpreters of law often struggle with the evidence to 
determine what the law is on hard legal questions (Dworkin 1975). The obscurity of law explains 
failures to appreciate the legality of rules.42 By contrast, it is much harder to explain away 
persistent positive intuitions of a rule’s legality. The property of being law is not the kind to be 
mistakenly detected by a large number of reasonable interpreters of law. It is hard to see, in other 
words, why there would be persistent illusory manifestations of legality.  
 There is another difference between the positive and negative extensional challenge. The 
mere fact that inclusive anti-positivism offers a different account of law's extension than 
positivism is hardly a problem. The problem arises if the positivist can mobilize theory-neutral 
intuitions of legality against the anti-positivist. That is what makes the false negatives so 
damning. Legal theorists who’ve thought long and hard about the legality of rules independently 
of the philosophical debate strongly judge that the Nazis had a legal system, and that the Fugitive 
                                                          
42 The inclusive anti-positivist can explain why the legality of morally optimific (but weakly conventional rules) 
might be obscure. The legality of rules is a function of their meeting a vague normative threshold. It is harder to 
recognize the legality of rules that just barely meet the threshold because they score well along a single evaluative 
dimension. If morally optimific but barely conventional rules are law, they are marginal cases of legality at best.  
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Slave Act was law. So, to have a viable theory, anti-positivists should worry about 
accommodating these cases.   
It is much harder to build a theory-neutral case against the anti-positivist based on the 
alleged false positives. Judges unexposed to the positivism/anti-positivism debate act as if moral 
principles are law. Even some positivists (inclusive positivists) agree that morally optimific 
principles can be (and in many jurisdictions are) law. They just have a different account of why, 
fundamentally, they are law—namely, in terms of an alleged convention within the jurisdiction 
allowing judges to treat morally optimific principles as law. The case where inclusive positivism 
and inclusive anti-positivism deliver incompatible verdicts concerns morally optimific (yet 
weakly social) rules in a jurisdiction where no widely accepted convention exists of treating 
morally optimific principles as law. And it is implausible that this extensional dispute can be 
resolved on pre-theoretical grounds alone. The case is too contested, independently of 
philosophical argument, for it to be decided based on the deliverances of pre-theoretical 
intuition. This is not a decisive showing that the inclusive anti-positivist is right about the case. It 
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